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Abstract This note presents a practical quantum cryptography protocol for
transmitting classical and quantum information secretly and directly.
First, let’s consider the transmission of classical message. The protocol is:
1. Alice prepares n bits for transmission:
a1a2 · · ·an, (1)
and chooses
{ϕAi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (2)
randomly from a K-element set
{αk =
kpi
K
, k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1} (3)
by means of local random number sources.
2. Alice prepares n single-photons, the i-th be in the state
|Ψi〉A0 = (ai ⊕ 1)|H〉+ ai|V 〉, (4)
where the ⊕ is the plus in F2; then changes the polarization directions of photons
separately and get
|Ψi〉A1 = (ai ⊕ 1)|ϕAi〉+ ai|ϕAi +
pi
2
〉; (5)
1
then sends these photons to Bob one by one.
3. Bob chooses
{ϕBi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (6)
randomly independently from the K-element set (3) by means of local random
number source, and changes the polarization directions of photons separately
as below:
|Ψi〉B1 = (ai ⊕ 1)|ϕAi + ϕBi〉+ ai|ϕAi + ϕBi +
pi
2
〉; (7)
then Bob sends back these photons to Alice.
4. Alice changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉A2 = (ai ⊕ 1)|ϕBi〉+ ai|ϕBi +
pi
2
〉; (8)
then sends them to Bob again.
5. Bob changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉B2 = (ai ⊕ 1)|H〉+ ai|V 〉; (9)
then measures the photons in bases {|H〉, |V 〉} one by one and gets the message
(1).
Now let’s consider the secret transmission of quantum information. It is
obviously that the changes needed are trivial. The protocol becomes:
1. Alice chooses n qubits for transmission:
|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, · · · , |ϕn〉, (10)
and chooses
{ϕAi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (11)
randomly from a K-element set
{αk =
kpi
K
, k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1} (12)
by means of local random number sources.
2. Alice prepares n single-photons, the i-th be in the state
|Ψi〉A1 = |ϕi + ϕAi〉; (13)
sends these photons to Bob one by one.
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3. Bob chooses
{ϕBi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (14)
randomly from the K-element set (3) by means of local random number source,
and changes the polarization directions of photons separately as below:
|Ψi〉B1 = |ϕi + ϕAi + ϕBi〉; (15)
then sends back these photons to Alice.
4. Alice changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉A2 = |ϕi + ϕBi〉; (16)
then sends them to Bob again.
5. Bob changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉B2 = |ϕi〉; (17)
then he gets the message (10).
Because ϕAi, ϕBiare chosen from set (3) randomly and independently, Eve
cannot get any information from simple intercept/resend attack. Unfortunately,
These two protocols cannot defend man in the middle(of quantum channel only)
attack, even though there is an authenticated classical channel. To overcome
this problem, Alice and Bob need to share {ϕCi, i = 1, · · · , n}secretly before
communication. Then, For example, the second protocol becomes:
1. Alice chooses n qubits for transmission:
|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, · · · , |ϕn〉, (18)
and chooses
{ϕAi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (19)
randomly from a K-element set
{αk =
kpi
K
, k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1} (20)
by means of local random number sources.
2. Alice prepares n single-photons, the i-th be in the state
|Ψi〉A1 = |ϕCi + ϕi + ϕAi〉; (21)
then sends these photons to Bob one by one.
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3. Bob chooses
{ϕBi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} (22)
randomly from the K-element set (3) by means of local random number source,
and changes the polarization directions of photons separately:
|Ψi〉B1 = |ϕCi + ϕi + ϕAi + ϕBi〉; (23)
then sends them back to Alice.
4. Alice changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉A2 = |ϕCi + ϕi + ϕBi〉; (24)
then sends them to Bob again.
5. Bob changes the polarization direction of the photons again and gets:
|Ψi〉B2 = |ϕi〉; (25)
then he gets the message (18).
The authentication information {ϕCi, i = 1, · · · , n} can be used repeatedly
under the protection of continuously changed local random numbers {ϕAi, ϕBi, i =
1, · · · , n} .
[1]C.H.Bennett, et al.,J.Cryptography(1992)5:3-28
4
